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TEN YEARS AFTER: KELO v. CITY OF NEWLONDON AND THE NOT
SO PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES
Stephen F. Broadus IV*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court decided one of the most controversial
cases of all time in 2005: Kelo v. City of New London.1 Long periods of
economic decline and unemployment led a Connecticut city to develop a plan to
revitalize the area.2 The plan was "projected to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to
increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed
city . . . ."3 The City prepared to exercise the power of eminent domain to obtain
the property it needed to implement the plan.
4
In the end, the Supreme Court held that the City's plan to employ eminent
domain under the guise of economic development satisfied the "public use"
requirement of the Fifth Amendnent.5 But the holding of the Court was just the
beginning. After Kelo, citizens were worried about losing their property in the
same way Suzette Kelo lost her property. Concerned constituents drove state
legislators to frantically revise eminent domain laws. Since this landmark
decision, over forty states have responded to Kelo by enacting legislation
restricting the use of eminent domain.
6
This Comment examines eminent domain today-ten years after Kelo. In
addition, this Comment examines how states have responded to the Kelo opinion
and argues that while Kelo adopted a broad interpretation of "public use," a
surge of eminent domain abuse has not occurred over the past ten years because
of the opinion. Part II of this Comment examines the background and history of
eminent domain takings in the United States. Part II also sets out the facts and
the opinions in Kelo. Part III examines legislation and cases after Kelo. Finally,
Part IV argues that while scholars and citizens were concerned that Kelo was a
step in the wrong direction, Kelo led to a wave of reform which has had a
positive effect on eminent domain.
* J.D. Candidate, Mississippi College School of Law. The author would like to thank Professor John
Haskell and the members of the Mississippi College Law Review for all of their hard work in making this
publication possible.
I. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
2. Id. at 473-74.
3. Id. at 472 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 507 (Conn. 2004)).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 489-90.
6. See infra Part Ill.
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II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF EMINENT DOMAIN
"Eminent domain is the power of a governmental entity to take private
property for a public use without the owner's consent."'7 The Fifth Amendment
allows the use of eminent domain when two conditions are met: "[T]he taking
must be for a 'public use' and 'just compensation' must be paid to the owner."'8
This provision of the Constitution, known as the "Takings Clause," applies to the
Federal Government and is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.9
At its conception, eminent domain was used to acquire land for such things
as highways, railroads, and other public works.10 While this sounds like a
narrow and relatively specific category of uses for which a piece of property
could be taken, the Supreme Court has always adopted a more liberal definition
of public use. To illustrate, in one of the Supreme Court's first eminent domain
cases,I I the Court held that even though a mining company placed an aerial
bucket line over a private individual's property for the development of mineral
resources that did not directly serve the public-unlike a highway or railroad-
the public use requirement was nevertheless satisfied.12 Thus, the Supreme
Court has always defined "public use" more expansively than what the words
actually denote. 13
A. Berman v. Parker: Modern Public Use
The Supreme Court held in Berman v. Parker that a plan aimed at curing a
blighted area was constitutional, even though a commercial piece of property
taken as a part of the plan was not blighted.14 The redevelopment condemned
land in a blighted area so the government could construct "streets, utilities,
recreational facilities, and schools."15 The plan further provided for the leftover
property to be sold and leased to private individuals or entities.16 Congress
declared that the taking was for a public use after Congress found that blighted
areas in Washington, D.C. were "injurious to the public health, safety, morals,
7. Rex Realty Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 322 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting ACCO
Unlimited Corp. v. City of Johnston, 611 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 2000)).
8. Brown v. Legal Foundation of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003); U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. Kclo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 n. 1 (2005).
10. Daniel C. Orlaskey, The Robin Hood Antithesis - Robbing from the Poor to Give to the Rich: How
Eminent Domain is Used to Take Property in Violation of the Fifth Amendment, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION,
GENDER & CLASS 515,517 (2006).
II. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906).
12. Id. at 532.
13. The plurality in Kelo recognized that the Court has always been more liberal with the definition of
public use: "when [the] Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th
century, it embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public purpose."' Kelo, 545
U.S. at 480.
14. 348 U.S. 26, 35-36 (1954).
15. Id. at 31.
16. Id. at 30; Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 (noting that "[u]nder the plan [in Berman], the area would be
condemned and part of it utilized for the construction of streets, schools, and other public facilities" and the
"remainder of the land would be leased or sold to private parties .... ").
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and welfare . "...,,17
The appellants in Berman challenged the plan and argued that since the land
that their department store was located on was unblighted property, the
government's use of eminent domain was unconstitutional.18 The appellants
claimed that their property was "commercial, not residential property; it is not
slum housing; it will be put into the project under the management of a private,
not a public, agency and redeveloped for private, not public use."1 9
The Supreme Court rejected the appellants' arguments and held that the Act
was constitutional.20 More specifically, the Court rejected the blight argument
and held that "[o]nce the question of public purpose has been decided, the
amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a
particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the
legislative branch."'2 1 Thus, the Court held that one unblighted parcel of land
does not affect the validity of the taking as a whole.
22
The Court further reasoned that it was not the function of the Court "to
determine whether a particular housing is or is not desirable" and noted that the
legislature has the power to determine that "the community should be beautiful
as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled. ' 23 The Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment does not stand in
the way if the legislature determines that Washington, D.C., should be clean.
24
After Berman, one can begin to see how the Court has expanded the
definition of public use over time. Even though one piece of property was not
blighted, the Court permitted the entire taking because it was part of the plan to
rejuvenate our Nation's capital-a public use. While Berman may not seem to
drastically expand the traditional definition of public use, the Supreme Court has
gradually expanded the definition of public use even further over time.
B. Expanding Berman: Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
Twenty years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed and expanded Berman in
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff25 The Court held that "[riedistribution of
fees simple to correct deficiencies in the market determined by the state
legislature to be attributable to land oligopoly is a rational exercise of the
17. Id. at 28 (citing District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 592, 60 Stat. 790
(1946)).
18. Id. at 31. The appellants also claimed that using eminent domain to crcate a "more attractive
community" did not qualify as a public use. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 31-32.
21. Id. at 35-36 (citing Shoemaker v. U.S., 147 U'S. 282, 298 (1893)). In other words, the Court held
that as long as the public purpose requirement is satisfied, the legislature has the power to decide how it wants
to accomplish its plan-whether it is on a piecemeal basis, or whether it is by condemning entire areas of land.
Id. It did not matter that the City took the approach of condemning an area and there were unblighted
properties included in that area. Id.
22. Id. at 35.
23. Id. at 33.
24. Id.
25. 467 U.S. 229, 230, 244 (1984).
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eminent domain power."' 26 The Court also held that even though the property
was transferred to private persons, that fact alone did not transform the taking
into a private taking.27
Concerns about a small class of private parties owning the majority of land
in Hawaii led the Hawaiian Legislature to pass the Land Reform Act.28 The
legislature found that "concentrated land ownership was responsible for skewing
the State's residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the
public tranquility and welfare."'29 The Act provided a way for the government to
increase land ownership by breaking up land that belonged to a small class of
private parties and transferring estates to lessees.30 When a certain number of
tenants filed applications, the Hawaii Housing Authority was required to
determine whether the acquisition of a particular piece of property "effectuate[d]
the public purposes of the Act." 31 Finally, if the Housing Authority found that
acquisition of a particular parcel would further the Act's purposes, then the
Housing Authority would negotiate with the parties and authorize eminent
domain.32
The appellee in Midkiff filed suit and claimed that the Act violated the Fifth
Amendment.33 The Court disagreed and found the Act constitutional, relying on
Berman and other Supreme Court jurisprudence to inform its decision.34 The
Court first noted that a taking is constitutional, so long as "the exercise of the
eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose . . . . 35 Further, "[w]hen the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its
means are not irrational ... empirical debates over the wisdom of takings ... are
not to be carried out in federal courts."'36 The Court had no trouble concluding
that the Act served a public purpose because it was not designed to benefit
private individuals-instead, it was designed to eliminate the "social and
economic evils of a land oligopoly. '37
The Supreme Court also rejected the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the
property taken must be possessed by the government at some point.38 The Court
held that "[i]t is not essential that the entire community, nor even any
considerable portion, directly enjoy or participate in any improvement for it to
constitute a public use."'39 In short, the Court ruled that its concern was the
26. Id. at 243.
27. Id. at 243-44.
28. Id. at 232-33. The Hawaiian legislature found that "while the State and Federal Governments owned
almost 49% of the State's land, another 47% was in the hands of only 72 private landowners." Id. at 232.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 231-32.
31. Id. at 233.
32. Id. at 233-34.
33. Id. at 234-35.
34. Id. at 243-45.
35. Id. at 241.
36. Id. at 242-43.
37. Id. at 241-42.
38. Id. at 243.
39. Id. at 244 (quoting Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923)).
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taking's purpose-not whether the government actually used the acquired
property.
40
C. Kelo v. City of New London: Expanding Precedent or a Substantial
Departure?
In Kelo, the City of New London sought to exercise eminent domain to
promote economic growth.4 1 With an employment rate almost doubling the
state's unemployment rate, the City decided to implement an economic
development program with the New London Development Corporation
("NLDC") responsible for condemning property and carrying out the ptan.
42
The NLDC implemented the program in the Fort Trumbull area, and all of the
necessary permits and plans were approved.43 Shortly after the project was
developed, pharmaceutical giant Pfizer announced its plan to build a S300
million research facility adjacent to the Fort Trumbull area.
44
The NLDC purchased most of the property that was included in the plan,
but had to exercise eminent domain over the remaining properties, which the
petitioners owned and challenged.45  The petitioners' properties were not
blighted-they were only taken because they were within the development
area.46 The petitioners contended that the City's use of eminent domain to foster
economic development was not a cognizable public use, and therefore violated
the Constitution.47 On the other hand, the City argued that the public use
requirement was satisfied because the project was "projected to create in excess
of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an
economically distressed city . .. .48
The trial court sided with the petitioners on all of the parcels except for one
and issued a permanent restraining order prohibiting the City from using eminent
domain.4 9 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the trial court
and held that all of the takings satisfied the public use requirement of the
Constitution.
50
1. The Majority Opinion
There were four different opinions in Kelo, but Justice Stevens' 5-4
majority opinion5 ' held that economic development is a valid public use and that
40. Id.
41. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473 (2005).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 473-74.
44. Id. at 473.
45. Id. at 475.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 484.
48. Id. at 472 (quoting Kelo v. City of Ncw London, 843 A.2d 500, 507 (Conn. 2004)).
49. Id. at 475-76.
50. Id.
5I. Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyerjoined Justice Stevens' opinion. Id. at 471.
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the City's project met the public use requirement.52 The majority, relying on
Berman and Midkiff first mentioned that it has never required "that condemned
property be put into use for the general public. ' 53 The Court noted that while the
City could not exercise eminent domain to confer private benefits, the City's
takings were "executed pursuant to a 'carefully considered' development
plan."'54 Since the City's plan did not benefit specific private parties, the Court
found the plan constitutional on this ground.55
The majority opinion next addressed whether the city's plan satisfied the
public use requirement.56 Justice Stevens wrote that the jurisprudence of the
Court "ha[s] defined [the public purpose] concept broadly, reflecting our
longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field."'5 7 The
Court noted that the "City ha[d] carefully formulated an economic development
plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community,
including-but by no means limited to-new jobs and increased tax revenue.' 58
Because the City carefully considered its plan, the Court held that the plan met
the public use requirement.59 Thus, the Court held that economic benefits to a
community could satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.60
2. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy joined the majority's opinion, but wrote separately to
express concern about using eminent domain as a way to take property from one
private party and give it to another private party.61 Kennedy advocated for a
more thorough rational basis review when land is taken from one private party
and given to another private party to ensure that the taking actually serves a
public purpose and is not pretextual.62 Justice Kennedy concluded that the City's
plan satisfied the public use requirement because it carefully provided for
economic development and did not benefit a single private party.
63
3. Justice O'Connor's Dissenting Opinion
Justice O'Connor authored a dissent that Chief Justice Rehnquist and
52. Id. at 489-490.
53. Id. at 479 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)).
54. Id. at 478 (quoting Kclo v. City of Ncw London, 843 A.2d 500, 536 (Conn. 2004)).
55. Id. Stated differently, the plan was constitutional bccausc "the City's developmcnt plan was not
adopted 'to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals,"' which would be prohibited by the
Constitution. Id.
56. Id. at 480-89.
57. Id. at 480.
58. Id. at 484.
59. Id.
60. Id. The Court also reviewed Strickley, Berman, and Midkiff and determined that economic benefits
were a public purpose just as much as the interests in those cases were. Id. at 484-85. In addition, the court
"decline[d] to second-guess the City's determinations as to what lands it need[cd] to acquire in order to
effectuate the project." Id. at 488-89.
61. Id. at 490-92 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 490-91.
63. Id. at 493.
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Justices Scalia and Thomas joined.64 Justice O'Connor's dissent reasoned that
the majority's opinion subjected all private property to takings by other private
individuals so long as that other private individual put it to a use that would be
more beneficial to the public.65 Justice O'Connor was principally concerned that
the majority's opinion was too broad and did not place any checks on the power
of eminent domain.
66
Justice O'Connor noted that over the years, three types of takings have been
identified as public uses.67 The first category occurs when the state transfers
private property to the public "for a road, a hospital, or a military base."'68 The
second situation is where property is transferred from the state to a private party
for the public's benefit.69 An example of the second situation would be a
transfer to a private party for the private party to construct a railroad or
stadium.70 The final category is similar to the second category, but the public
purpose is not as clear.71 Justice O'Connor referred to this category as "takings
that serve a public purpose."'72 Unlike the example in the second category, this
final category does not directly and immediately serve the public like a train
would; therefore, O'Connor determined, this is where Kelo v. City of New
London fits.73
Justice O'Connor then drew a line in the sand by distinguishing the public
uses in Berman and MidJkiff from the alleged public purpose the economic
development plan would serve in Kelo.74  "In both those cases, the
extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative
harm on society-in Berman through blight resulting from extreme poverty and
in Midkiff through oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth."' 75 The public
purpose in those cases was served by eliminating the harmful activity.76 Justice
O'Connor then distinguished Kelo from Berman and Midkiff by noting that the
homes taken in this case were not the source of any harm.
77
64. Id. at 494 .(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas joincd in O'Connor's dissenting opinion but
wrote separately to address the possible effects of the majority opinion. Id. at 505 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas was concerned about the possible effects of the Court's opinion on poor communities. Id. at
521-22.
65. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 497-98.






74. Id. at 499.
75. Id. at 500 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28-29 (1954); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, 232 (1984)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
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III. KELO's AFTERMATH: A LOOK AT THE LAW TEN YEARS LATER
Today, the property that was taken as a result of the Kelo decision sits
barren-pharmaceutical giant Pfizer pulled out, and the City never implemented
its development plans.78 While nothing has changed in the past ten years on the
property the City took, the legal landscape has been completely redeveloped.
The Supreme Court mentioned that using eminent domain for economic
development is a controversial matter.79 No Justice on the Supreme Court,
however, had any idea of what was to follow their landmark decision. After the
Kelo opinion, terror surged through the American people.80 They believed that,
as Justice O'Connor put in her dissent, "[n]othing is to prevent the State from
replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or
any farm with a factory."81 But as will be seen from the state legislative and
judicial responses discussed below, Kelo caused a wave of reform that lead to the
opposite of what the public feared: more stringent limitations on the exercise of
eminent domain.
Over forty states have passed legislation limiting the power of sovereigns to
use eminent domain for economic purposes.82 Just one month after Kelo,
legislators in twenty-one states introduced bills aimed at limiting eminent
domain.83 The reaction garnered by the Kelo opinion was overwhelming to say
the least.
And even though most states have passed legislation aimed at limiting the
effect of Kelo, many scholars have questioned the effectiveness of the reforms
that were put into place.84 The scholarly reaction seems counterintuitive: how
could enacting statutes aimed at curbing eminent domain abuse be ineffective
and not good for eminent domain? The answer is that it cannot be. At its core,
the fact that states have even enacted laws after this opinion demonstrates that
states are unwilling to go as far as the Supreme Court did in Kelo.
In addition to over forty states enacting reform, the judicial system has
responded unfavorably to Kelo.85 Before Kelo, states were using economic
development to exercise eminent domain. Two conclusions can be drawn from
78. Seized Property Sits Vacant Nine Years After Landmark Kelo Eminent Domnain Case, FOX NEWS
(Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/03/20/scized-propcrty-sits-vacant-nine-ycars-after-
landmark-eminent-domain-case/.
79. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 (2005). See also City of Norwood v. Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1112 (Ohio
2006) (mentioning that "eminent domain engenders great debate. Its use, though necessary, is fraught with
great economic, social, and legal implications for the individual and the community.").
80. llya Somin, Article, The Limnits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 2100, 2108-14 (2009).
81. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 503 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
82. See infra Part 1ll. A.
83. Anastasia C. Sheffler-Wood, Comment, Where Do We Go fron Here? States Revise Eminent
Domain Legislation in Response to Kelo, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 617,617 (2006).
84. Somin, supra note 80, at 2103-04 ("the majority of the newly enacted post-Kelo reform laws are
likely to be ineffective."); Asher Alavi, Note, Kelo Six Years Later: State Responses, Ranifications, and
Solutions for the Future, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 311, 312 (2011) ("Despite the public backlash, the
majority of state eminent domain laws do little to limit takings for 'economic revitalization' projects ... .
85. See infra Part Ill.B.
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these facts. First, Kelo cannot be the direct cause of this form of eminent domain
abuse-it was already occurring.86  Second, state courts that had previously
embraced economic development as a public use enacted reform in the wake of
Kelo, abrogating the holdings of those courts.8 7 Thus, the nearly-decade-old
speculation that Kelo was going to lead to a wave of eminent domain abuse is
not tenable.
A. Ten Years of Eminent Domain Reform Legislation in the Making
The Supreme Court noted in Kelo that states have the power to place more
stringent limitations than the federal limitations on eminent domain,88 So even
though Kelo adopted an extremely broad standard for what satisfies the public
use requirement, the Kelo holding represents the outer limits of public use
jurisprudence. As one court has noted: "[Kelo] provid[es] a federal
constitutional floor for the definition of a public use that allows states to build
upon this floor should they choose to do so.' '89 In sum, states can limit eminent
domain in whatever way the states deem appropriate.
A common response to Kelo has been legislation that specifically states that
economic development does not constitute a valid public use.90 In addition,
some states have added that enhancement of tax revenues does not constitute a
public use.9 1 Another trend worth mentioning is that most states still permit
takings for blight, public nuisances, utilities, roads, and parks, among others.92
Finally, some states have placed the burden on the party seeking to exercise
eminent domain to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the property
sought to be taken will be put to a public use.93
Alabama
Alabama was quick in enacting reform legislation after Kelo. Alabama's
statute provides that "a municipality or county may not condemn property for the
purposes of private retail, office, commercial, industrial, or residential
development; or primarily for enhancement of tax revenue; or for transfer to a
person, nongovernmental entity, public-private partnership, corporation, or other
86. See infra Part III.B.I.
87. See infra Part II.BI.
88. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005).
89. Whittaker v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 437 Fcd. Appx. 105, 108 (3d Cir. 2011).
90. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia are among the states that specifically mention economic development as
being prohibited.
91. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(4) (West through Acts 343 to 669 of the 2014 Regular Session)
(defining economic development to cover the enhancement of tax revenues).
92. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-24-4.5-7 (LexisNexis through the 2014 Second Regular Session and
Technical Special Session of the 118th General Assembly, P.L. I through P.L. 226) (allowing eminent domain
for blight, public nuisance, and other conditions existing on the parcel).
93. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-101(2)(b) (West through the Second Regular Session of the Sixty-
Ninth General Assembly and amendments adopted through the Nov. 4, 2014 General Election). This statute,
however, has since been held unconstitutional in Colorado. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185
P.3d 161 (Colo. 2008) (en bane).
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business entity."94 The reform did not affect Alabama's power to use eminent
domain for blight, streets, utilities, parks, or recreational facilities.95
Alaska
Alaska's legislature responded to Kelo by enacting legislation that does not
recognize economic development as a public use.96 Besides certain enumerated
circumstances, "[tihe power of eminent domain may not be exercised to acquire
private property from a private person for the purposes of transferring title to the
property to another private person for economic development .... "97 Eminent
domain also may not be used in Alaska "for the purposes of developing a
recreational facility or project if the property to be acquired includes an
individual landowner's personal residence or recreational structure or" .a portion
of a private individual's property is near the site which is proposed to be taken
unless that private person has consented.98 Economic development is defined to
mean the "development of property for a commercial enterprise carried on for
profit or to increase tax revenue, tax base, or employment."99
Arizona
Arizona responded to the Kelo opinion by passing eminent domain reform
legislation.100 Arizona passed Proposition 207 in 2006, which limits eminent
domain to public uses.101 In turn, economic development is not a public use.102
California
In 2008, California's electorate passed a constitutional amendment.103
Under the amended California constitution, "[t]he State and local government
are prohibited from acquiring by eminent domain an owner-occupied residence
for the purpose of conveying it to a private person."'04 But this provision does
not apply "for the purpose of protecting public health or safety; preventing
serious, repeated criminal activity; responding to an emergency; or remedying
environmental contamination that poses a threat to public health and safety."'105
94. S.B. 68, 2005 Leg., Ist Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005), H.B. 654, 2006 Lcg., Rcg. Sess. (Ala. 2006)
(codified at ALA. CODE § 11-47-170(b) (LcxisNcxis through the end of the 2014 Regular Session)).
95. ALA. CODE § I 1-47-170(b).
96. H.B. 318, 24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2006) (codified at ALASKA STAT. §§ 29.35.030, 09.55.240
(Current through the 2014 Regular Session of the Twenty-Eighth State Legislature)).
97. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.240(d). The statute lists consent, statutory authorization, necessity, and
a common carrier exception, among others. Id.
98. Id. § 09.55.240(e). Alaska defined recreational facility in subsection (h)(5). Id. § 09.55.240(h)(5).
99. Id. § 09.55.240(h)(2).
100. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1131 (Current through the Second Regular and Second Special
Sessions of the Fifty-Second Legislature); Proposition 207 (Ariz. 2006),
http://apps.azsos.gov/clection/2006/info/PubPamphlet/SunSoundscnglish/prop2O7.htm.
101. Id.
102. Id. § 12-1136(5)(b).
103. CAL. CONST. art 1, § 19.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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Colorado
Colorado's reform legislation states that 'public use' shall not include the
taking of private property for transfer to a private entity for the purpose of
economic development or enhancement of tax revenue."106 If eminent domain is
being exercised to eliminate blight, the condemnor is required to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the taking is necessary.107  Otherwise, the
condemnor must only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
condemnation satisfies the public use standard.
108
Connecticut
Connecticut's reform provides that "[n]o real property may be acquired by a
redevelopment agency by eminent domain.., for the primary purpose of
increasing local tax revenue."109
Delaware
Delaware adopted restrictions on eminent domain in 2005 and 2009. In
2009, Delaware passed legislation that merely restricted eminent domain to a
public use and provided pre-take procedures.1 l0 In 2009, however, Delaware
strengthened its reform and passed legislation defining public use as not
"includ[ing] the generation of public revenues, increase in tax base, tax revenues,
employment or economic health, through private land owners or economic
development."' I I In addition, the condemnor has the burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence that the taking satisfies the statutory definition of
public use.112
Florida
Florida enacted eminent domain reforms on May 11, 2006.113 Florida's
reform is one of the most sweeping reforms out of any of the states: the
prevention or elimination of blight is no longer a public use. 1
14
Georgia
Georgia's reform provides that economic development is not a cognizable
106. H.B. 1411, 2006 Leg. Serv., 65th Gen. Asscmb., 2d Reg. Scss. (Colo. 2006); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 38-1-101(b)(1) (West through the Second Regular Session of the Sixty-Ninth General Assembly and
amendments adopted through the Nov. 4, 2014 General Election)).
107. COLO. REV. SrAT. ANN. § 38-1-101(2)(b).
108. Id.
109. S.B. 167, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Scss. (Conn. 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-127(b) (Current
through P.A. 14-235 (all legislation of the 2014 Regular Session)).
110. S.B. 7, 145th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9505 (Current
through 79 Del. Laws, Ch. 443)).
Ill. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9501A(a).
112. Id. § 9501A(d).
113. H.B. 1567, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.014 (West through Ch. 255
(End) of the 2014 2nd Reg. Sess. and Sp. "A" Sess. of the Twenty-Third Legislature)).
114. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.014(2).
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public use. 115 Economic development is defined as an increase in tax revenues,
employment, or the general improvement of economic health, "when the activity
does not result in: (A) Transfer of land to public ownership; (B) Transfer of
property to a private entity that is a public utility; (C) Lease of property to
private entities that occupy an incidental area within a public project; or (D) The
remedy of blight."] 16
Idaho
Idaho enacted legislation in 2006 mandating that eminent domain is not to
be used "[f]or the purpose of promoting or effectuating economic
development .... "117 Further, a condemning entity seeking to exercise eminent
domain in urban renewal and deteriorating areas must prove certain factors by
clear and convincing evidence.1 18 Finally, a provision was included in the
reform stating that eminent domain is not to be used "[flor any alleged public
use which is merely a pretext for the transfer of the condemned property... to a
private party." 19
Illinois
Illinois' reform provides that where eminent domain is exercised "to
acquire property for private ownership or control . . . then the condemning
authority must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the acquisition of the
property ... is (i) primarily for the benefit, use, or enjoyment of the public and
(ii) necessary for a public purpose."'120 Eminent domain can still be used to
eliminate blight.12 1
Indiana
Indiana responded to Kelo like a few other states by providing that
economic development is not a public use.122 "The term [public use] does not
include the public benefit of economic development, including an increase in a
tax base, tax revenues, employment, or general economic health."123 Eminent
domain may still be used for blight, public nuisance, and other conditions that
115. H.B. 1313, 2005 Gcn. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006); GA. CODE ANN § 22-I-1(9)(B) (West
through Acts 343 to 669 of the 2014 Regular Session). For a more in-depth discussion of Georgia's eminent
domain reform, see Stephen D. Morrison, Jr., Protecting Private Property: An Analysis of Georgia's Response
to Kelo v. City of New London, 2 J. MARSHALL L.J. 51, 62-91 (2009).
116. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(4).
117. H.B. 555, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701A(2)(b) (Current through
the 2014 Session).
118. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701A(2)(b)(ii).
119. Id. § 7-701(A)(2)(a).
120. S.B. 3086, 94th Gen. Asscmb., Reg. Sess. (11. 2006); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 30/5-5-5(a) (West
current through P.A. 98-1132 of the 2014 Reg. Scss.).
121. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 30/5-5-5.
122. H.B. 1010, 114th Gen. Assemb. 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-24-4.5-1
(LcxisNexis through the 2014 Second Regular Session and Technical Special Session of the 118th General
Assembly, P.L. I through P.L. 226).
123. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-24-4.5-1 (a).
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exist on the parcel.124
Iowa
Iowa enacted legislation in 2006 that excludes economic development from
the definition of public use. 125 The statute states that public use "does not mean
economic development activities resulting in increased tax revenues, increased
employment opportunities, privately owned or privately funded residential.. . or
industrial development, or the lease of publicly owned property to a private
party.'1 26 Iowa still permits the condemnation of blighted land.
127
Kansas
Kansas' eminent domain reform allows "[t]he taking of private property by
eminent domain for the purpose of selling, leasing or otherwise transferring such
property to any private entity" only in enumerated circumstances.128 Some
examples where takings and subsequent ransfers to private entities are allowed
are for the development of roads or parks, by public utilities or by municipalities
who have obtained consent, and blight.1
29
Kentucky
Kentucky passed legislation that prohibits the transfer of private property
"to a private owner for the purpose of economic development that benefits the
general public only indirectly, such as by increasing the tax base, tax revenues,
or employment, or by promoting the general economic health of the
community."] 30 The statute also contains a list of acceptable public uses. 
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124. Id. § 32-24-4.5-7.
125. H.F. 2351, 81st Gen. Assemb., Rcg. Scss. (Iowa 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 6A.22 (West through
legislation from the 2014 Reg. Sess.).
126. IOWA CODE ANN. § 6A.22 (5)(a)(v)(b).
127. Id. § 6A.22 (2)(a)(5)(a).
128. S.B. 323, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-501b (West through 2014
regular session).
129. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-501b(a)-(f).
130. H.B. 508, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675 (West current through
the end of the 2015 regular session).
131. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675. Kentucky's public uses are limited to the following:
(a) Ownership of the property by the Commonwealth, a political subdivision of the
Commonwealth, or other governmental entity;
(b) The possession, occupation, or enjoyment of the property as a matter of right by the
Commonwealth, a political subdivision of the Commonwealth, or other governmental entity;
(c) The acquisition and transfer of property for the purpose of eliminating blighted areas, slum
areas, or substandard and insanitary areas in accordance with KRS Chapter 99;
(d) The use of the property for the creation or operation of public utilities or common carriers; or
(e) Other use of the property expressly authorized by statute.
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Louisiana
Louisiana joined the group of states that placed constitutional amendments
on ballots for the electorate to vote on.132 Louisiana's amendment provides that
"[n]either economic development, enhancement of tax revenue, [nior any
incidental benefit to the public shall be considered in determining whether the
taking or damaging of property is for a public purpose."'133 Louisiana's
constitution also limits acceptable public purposes to specific uses, one of which
is blight.134
Maine
Maine's eminent domain reform legislation prohibits eminent domain "[f]or
the purposes of private retail, office, commercial, industrial or residential
development; ... for the enhancement of tax revenue; or ... [flor transfer to an
individual or a for-profit business entity."'135 Maine's statute includes a blight
exception and a utility exception.136
Michigan
Michigan's constitution provides that "the taking of private property for
transfer to a private entity for the purpose of economic development or
enhancement of tax revenues" is not a cognizable public purpose. 137 Michigan's
constitution now requires the condemnor to prove by clear and convincing
evidence "that the taking of that property is for a public use" when the
condemnation is for blight remediation.138
Minnesota
Minnesota's reform specifies that "[t]he public benefits of economic
development, including an increase in tax base, tax revenues, employment, or
general economic health, do not by themselves constitute a public use or public
purpose."'139 A blight exception allows unblighted properties to be condemned if
the unblighted property is in an area where more than 50% of the buildings are
blighted and there are no feasible alternatives available to cure the blighted
132. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4. See generally Jennie Jackson Miller, Commcnt, Saving Private
Redevelopment: Rescuing Louisiana From Its Reaction to Kelo, 68 LA. L. REV. 631, 663-677 (2008)
(discussing the purpose of Louisiana's eminent domain reform and advocating for sound judicial
interpretation).
133. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(3).
134. Id. § 4(B)(2).
135. L.D. 1870, 122d Leg., 2d Reg. Scss. (Me. 2006); ME. REV. STAT. tit. I, § 816(l) (Current with
legislation through the 2013 Second Regular Session of the 126th Legislature).
136. ME. REV. STAT. tit. I, § 816(2), (3).
137. M.C.L.A. CONST. art. 10, § 2.
138. Id.
139. S.F. 2750, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2006),
https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/bills/tcxt.phpnumbcr=SF2750&version=5&scssion=ls84&scssion-Year=2
006&scssion number=0; MINN. STAT. § 117.025(l I)(b) (Current through Chapter 313, 2014 Regular Session).
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properties.140 In addition, "remediation of an environmentally contaminated
area, reduction of abandoned property, or removal of a public nuisance" also
qualify as a public use.
14 1
Mississippi
Mississippi did not enact any kind of reform until 2011. In 2011, voters in
Mississippi passed a constitutional amendment providing that "[n]o property
acquired by the exercise of the power of eminent domain... shall, for a period
of ten years after its acquisition, be transferred ... to any person, non-
governmental entity, public-private partnership, corporation, or other business
entity . ... "142 Mississippi's constitution provides a list of exceptions.
143
Missouri
Missouri does not allow the acquisition of property by eminent domain
"solely [for] economic development purposes."'144 Economic development is
defined as "a use of a specific piece of property.., which would provide an
increase in the tax base, tax revenues, employment, and general economic health,
and does not include the elimination of blight[] .... ,,145 In regard to blight, the
statute requires the condemnor to consider whether each parcel of property meets
the blight criteria, and only then can property be condemned. 
146
Montana
Montana's reform expressly prohibits the use of eminent domain "for urban
renewal ... if the purpose of the project is to increase government tax
revenue."147 Like other states, takings are allowed for urban renewal if the area
is blighted.148
140. MINN. STAT. § 117.025(6).
141. Id.
142. Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 17A.
143. Id.
144. Mo. REV. STAT. § 523.271(1) (Current through the 97th General Assembly, 2nd Regular Session).
For a more thorough discussion of Missouri's post-Kelo reform, see generally Stanley A. Leasure & Carol J.
Miller, Eminent Domain-Missouri's Response to Kclo, 63 J. Mo. B. 178, 186-190 (2007); Anita J. Patcl,
Interpreting Eminent Domain in Missouri: Elimination of Blight Is Allright, 74 Mo. L. REV. 235, 242-250
(2009); Dale A. Whitman, Eminent Domain Reform in Missouri: A Legislative Memoir, 71 Mo. L. REV. 721
(2006).
145. Id. § 523.271(2).
146. Id. § 523.274. But see Allright Props., Inc. v. Tax Increment Fin. Comm'n, 240 S.W.3d 777, 781
(Mo. Ct. App. 2007) ("We interpret the statute as authorizing the condemning authority to take the land so long
as a preponderance of the area, as a whole, is blighted. Although we are not certain why the General Assembly
wanted the condemning authority to consider each parcel individually, the statute's evolution causes us to
believe that determining blight according to total square footage is the only reasonable construction of the
statute.").
147. S.B. 41, 363, 56th Leg., Jan. Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-102(12) (West
through the 2013 Regular and Special Sessions).
148. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30-102(12).
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Nebraska
Nebraska made it unlawful to take property "for an economic development
purpose."'149 Although Nebraska prohibits economic development takings, the
statute contains a list of exceptions.150
Nevada
Nevada's electorate passed a constitutional amendment in 2008.151 The
constitutional amendment provides that the "transfer of any interest in property
taken in an eminent domain proceeding from one private party to another private
party" is not a public use.152 In addition, the government now has the burden to
prove that its exercise of eminent domain satisfies the public use standard.153
Finally, in addition to other minor changes, the amendment creates a right of
reverter in the original property owner where the government does not use the
property for its stated purpose within five years. 154
New Hampshire
New Hampshire enacted legislation a year after Kelo that defines public
use.155  The definition excludes private economic development and private
commercial enterprise from being a cognizable public use.156 As with many
other state statutes, New Hampshire law specifically prohibits increased tax
revenues and employment opportunities. 157 The New Hampshire legislation also
includes exceptions for removal of "slums . . . , structures beyond repair, public
nuisances, structures unfit for human habitation or use, and abandoned property
when such structures or property constitute a menace to health and
safety ... ."158
New Mexico
New Mexico took a unique approach when it reformed its eminent domain
laws after Kelo. New Mexico's reform does not allow eminent domain to be
used for the remediation of blight.159 The statute also limits the ability of
149. L.B. 924, 99th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ncb. 2006), available at
http://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/103/PDF/Intro/LB924.pdf; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 76-710.04(l)
(West through end of 2014 Regular Session).
150. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-710.04(1).




155. S.B. 287, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2006), available at
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2006/SB0287.html; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 203:3(XIV)(b)
(Current through Chapter 330 (End) of the 2014 Reg. Sess.).
156. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 203:3(XIV)(b).
157. Id.
158. Id. § 203:3(XIV)(a)(3).
159. H.B. 393, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2007); S.B. 401, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2007); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 3-60A-3 (LexisNcxis through the end of the Second Regular Session of the Fifty-First
Legislature (2014 legislation)).
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municipalities to condemn land.160 The statute provides: "the intention of the
legislature [is] to vest municipalities with all powers, other than the power of
eminent domain .... ,1161 Eminent domain is allowed for traditional purposes.162
North Carolina
North Carolina restricted the power of eminent domain by adding a
provision placing limitations on both private and public condemnors.16 3 The
North Carolina legislature also amended the definition of blight, requiring a
"determin[ation] by the planning commission that at least two thirds of the
number of buildings within the area are of the character described in this
subdivision and substantially contribute to the conditions making such area a
blighted area .... ",164
North Dakota
North Dakota enacted legislation mirroring many other states that excludes
"an increase in tax base, tax revenues, employment, [and] general economic
health" from public uses. 165 The statute also provides that property "may not be
taken for the use of, or ownership by, any private individual or entity, unless that
property is necessary for conducting a common carrier or utility business."
166
Ohio
Ohio first passed a bill that placed a moratorium prohibiting takings in
unblighted areas "when the primary purpose for the taking is economic
development that will ultimately result in ownership of that property being
vested in another private person."'1 67 In 2007 (six months after the moratorium
ended), Ohio enacted legislation that replaced the moratorium.168 The statute
160. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-60A-3.
161. id.
162. Id.
163. H.B. 1965, 2005-2006 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-l(a) (West
through the end of the 2014 Regular Session of the General Assembly). The provision states:
it is the intent of the General Assembly that ... the uses set out in G.S. 40A-3 are the exclusive
uses for which the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain is granted to private
condemnors, local public condemnors, and other public condemnors. Effective August 15, 2006,
a local act granting the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain to a private
condemnor, local public condemnor, or other public condemnor for a use or purpose other than
those granted to it in G:S. 40A-3(a), (b), (bl), or (c) is not effective for that use or purpose.
Provided that, any eminent domain action commenced before August 15, 2006, for a use or
purpose granted in a local act, may be lawfully completed pursuant to the provisions of that local
act ....
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-I(a)
164. Id. § 160A-503(2).
165. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-15-01(3) (West, Westlaw through chapter 522 of the 2013 Regular
Session of the 63d Legislative Assembly); S.B. 2214, 60th Leg. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2007).
166. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-15-01(2).
167. S.B. 167, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005); S.B. 7, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ohio 2007).
168. OHtO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.01 (LexisNexis through Legislation passed by the 130th General
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provides that "'Public Use' does not include any taking that is for conveyance to
a private commercial enterprise, economic development, or solely for the
purpose of increasing public revenue.. ." unless the property is transferred to a
party authorized by the statute.169 In addition, the reform requires "the taking
agency [to] show by a preponderance of the evidence that the taking is necessary
and for a public use."170 Blight was also redefined to:
mean an area in which at least seventy per cent of the parcels are
blighted parcels and those blighted parcels substantially impair
or arrest the sound growth of the state . . ., retard the provision
of housing accommodations, constitute an economic or social
liability, or are a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or
welfare .... 171
Finally, the reform provides a right for the original owner to repurchase the
property in certain circumstances.172
Oregon
Oregon's reform prohibits transferring land to a private party.173 The
prohibition restricting transfers to private parties does not apply to "property that
constitutes a danger to the health or safety of the community[,] ... any timber,
crops, topsoil, gravel or fixtures[,] . . . [or] property condemned for maintenance,
improvement, or construction of transportation facilities, transportation systems,
utility facilities or utility transmission systems."174
Pennsylvania
After Kelo, Pennsylvania prohibits "the exercise by any condemnor of the
power of eminent domain to take private property in order to use it for private
enterprise .... 175 Railroads, utilities, and common carriers are exceptions to
this general prohibition.176  Eminent domain can still be used on land
constituting a public nuisance, abandoned property, blighted property, and
Assembly and filed with the Secretary of State through File 140 (SB 143)).
169. Id. § 163.01(H)(1).
170. Id. § 163.02 1(A) (LexisNexis).
171. Id. § 1.08(A).
172. Id. § 163.211.
173. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35.015(1) (West through End of the 2014 Reg. Sess. and ballot measures
approved at the Nov. 4, 2014 General Election). Revisions to Acts made by the Oregon Reviser were
unavailable at the time of publication.
174. Id. § 35.015(2).
175. 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 204(a) (West through 2014 Regular Session Acts I to 171, 173 to 198
and 200 to 204); S.B. 881, 2005-2006 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Penn. 2006); H.B. 2054, 2005-2006 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Penn. 2006); See generally Anthony B. Scitz, Comment, The Property Rights Protection
Act: An Overview of Pennsylvania's Response to Kclo v. City of New London, 18 WIDENER L. REV. 205, 226-
237(2005).
176. 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 204(b)(2)(i)-(ii).
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property taken for development of low-income housing.177
Rhode Island
Eminent domain cannot be used for economic development in Rhode Island
unless the condemnor has authorization and a plan has been approved by an act
of the elected governing body. 178
South Carolina
South Carolina passed a constitutional amendment prohibiting the use of
eminent domain for economic development.179 The amendment contains a
blight exception that may be utilized only after the General Assembly passes a
law specifically stating that eminent domain may be used.
180
South Dakota
In 2006, the governor of South Dakota enacted legislation prohibiting
takings primarily for tax revenue enhancement.181 The legislation also outlaws
the use of eminent domain "[flor transfer to any private person,
nongovernmental entity, or other public-private business entity.'
' 182
Tennessee
Tennessee's reform stipulates that "'Public use' shall not include either
private use or benefit, or the indirect public benefits resulting from private
economic development and private commercial enterprise, including increased
tax revenue and increased employment opportunity. . ." except in certain
circumstances.183 The circumstances allowed by the statute include public
transportation, public utilities, urban renewal in blighted areas, and private uses
incidental to public use. 184
Texas
Texas' reform legislation defines what is not a public use.185 Eminent
177. Id. § 204(b)(3)-(7).
178. S.B. 2728, 2008 Gen. Assemb. Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2008), available at
http://webservcr.rilin.state.ri.us/BillTextO8/ScnatcTextO8/S2728.pdf; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-64.12-7 (Current
through the January 2014 session).
179. S.C. CONST. art. I,§ 13.
180. Id.
181. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11-7-22.1 (Current through the 2014 regular session, 2014 gencral election
results, and Supreme Court Rule 14-10); H.B. 1080, 2006 Leg., 81stScss. (S.D. 2006).
182. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11 -7-22.1.
183. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (Current through the 2014 regular session); H.B. 3450, 104th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2006); H.B. 3700, 104th Gcn. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Tenn. 2006); S.B. 3296,
104th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2006).
184. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2)(A)-(D).
185. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (West through the end of the 2013 Third Called Session of the
83rd Legislature); H.B. 1495, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007); S.B. 7, 79th Leg., 2d Called Sess. (Tex. 2005).
See generally Adrianne Archer, Restricting Kelo: Will Redefining "Blight" in Senate Bill 7 be the Light at the
End of the Tunnel, 37 ST. MARY'S L. J. 795, 819-847 (2006) (providing background on Texas' public use
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domain may not be used if the taking will "confer[] a private benefit on a
particular private party through the use of the property; (2) is for a public use
that is merely a pretext to confer a private benefit on a particular private party;
(3) is for economic development purposes.. .; or (4) is not for a public use."186
The statute further provides that economic development can be a valid public use
if "the economic development is a secondary purpose resulting from municipal
community development or municipal urban renewal activities to eliminate an
existing affirmative harm on society from slum or blighted areas .... -"187
Utah
Utah's post-Kelo reform did not define economic development or ban it like
most other states have done. Instead, Utah's reform states that "[p]roperty may
not be taken by a political subdivision of the state unless the governing body of
the political subdivision approves the taking."'1 88 Further, the owner of the
property must be provided with written notice.189 Utah has a long list of
purposes that satisfy the public use requirement. 190
Vermont
On April 14, 2006, the governor of Vermont signed a bill into law that
prohibits eminent domain "if the taking is primarily for purposes of economic
development."'19 1 In addition to passing the eminent domain reform legislation,
the blight provision was amended: "[n]o area shall be determined to be a
blighted area solely or primarily because its condition and value for tax purposes
are less than the condition and value projected as the result of the
implementation of any State, municipal, or private redevelopment plan."'
' 92
Virginia
Virginia's reform limits public use to enumerated circumstances
specifically provided by the statute. Public use is limited to the followings
circumstances:
(i) the property is taken for the possession, ownership,
jurisprudence and discussing Texas' post-Kelo reform). Texas' reform legislation has been criticized for not
"actually forbidding the kinds of abuses they supposedly target." Ilya Somin, Texas' Amendment 11: Another
Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform that Falls Short, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, Nov. 10, 2009,
http://volokh.com/2009/I 1/10/texas-amendment-I I-anothcr-post-kelo-eminent-domain-reform-that-fal Is-short/.
The author also criticizes the reform by noting that "Texas is one of many states where the definition of 'blight'
is so broad as to include virtually any property that the government might want to condemn." Id.
186. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2206.001(b).
187. Id.
188. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-504(b) (LexisNexis through the 2014 General Session); H.B. 365, 2007
Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2007); H.B. 168, 2006 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2006).
189. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-504(2)(c).
190. Id. § 78B-6-501.
191. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1040(a) (West through the laws of the Adjourned Session of the 2013-
2014 Verniont General Assembly (2014)); S.B. 246, 2005-2006 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2000).
192. Tit. 12, § 1040(a).
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occupation, and enjoyment of property by the public or a public
corporation; (ii) the property is taken for construction,
maintenance, or operation of public facilities by public
corporations or by private entities provided that there is a written
agreement with a public corporation providing for use of the
facility by the public; (iii) the property is taken for the creation
or functioning of any public service corporation, public service
company, or railroad; (iv) the property is taken for the provision
of any authorized utility service by a government utility
corporation; (v) the property is taken for the elimination of
blight provided that the property itself is a blighted property; or
(vi) the property taken is in a redevelopment or conservation
area and is abandoned or the acquisition is needed to clear title
where one of the owners agrees to such acquisition or the
acquisition is by agreement of all the owners. 19 3
West Virginia
West Virginia's post-Kelo law states, "[I]n no event may 'public use', for
the purposes of this subdivision, be construed to mean the exercise of eminent
domain primarily for private economic development." ' 194 The statute provides a
long list of acceptable public uses. 1
95
Wisconsin
Wisconsin joined the mix of other states by prohibiting the transfer of non-
blighted property "if the condemnor intends to convey or lease the acquired
property to a private entity."'196 Wisconsin also tightened up the definition of
blight.197 The new law states that "[p]roperty that consists of only one dwelling
unit is not blighted property unless ... at least one of the following applies: [1]
The property is not occupied by the owner of the property. .. or an individual
related to the owner [or] . . . [2] The crime rate ... is at least 3 times the crime
rate in the remainder of the municipality. . ... 198
Wyoming
Wyoming enacted legislation that redefines public purpose.199 In addition,
193. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-219.1 (A) (Current through the 2014 Regular Session and Acts 2014, Sp. Sess.
I, c. 2, of the General Assembly); H.B. 2954, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007); S.B. 781, 2007 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007); S.B. 1296, 2007 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Scss. (Va. 2007).
194. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-1-2(l 1) (LexisNexis through the 2014 Regular, First and Second
Extraordinary Sessions); H.B. 4048, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2006).
195. Id. § 54-1-2.
196. WIS. STAT. § 32.03(6)(b) (Current through Act 117, dated January 16, 2014).
197. Id. § 32.03(6)(a).
198. Id.
199. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-801(c)(Current hrough the 2014 Budget Session of the Legislature); H.B.
124, 2007 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2007). See generally Matt Micheli & Mike Smith, Land & Water Law
Division: The More Things Change, the More Things Stay the Same: A Practitioner 's Gnide to Recent Changes
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Wyoming's reform requires good faith negotiations, enhances notice obligations,
and adds a provision where the original owner can reacquire the property if the
condemnor does not use the property for ten years.200
B. The Judicial Reaction
Surprisingly, the judicial reaction to Kelo has not been in the spotlight as
much as the legislative reaction.201 The legislature has looked with disdain upon
takings for economic development since Kelo, as have state courts. And while
the Kelo opinion has been sharply criticized by many, the foregoing section
demonstrates that Kelo may have done more good than bad: by causing a wave
of eminent domain reform legislation. Similarly, the judicial reaction to Kelo
has been for the better-namely, states are not using economic redevelopment o
abuse eminent domain.
1. Pre-Kelo Decisions Upholding Economic Development as a Valid Public Use
Overall, since Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court has been expanding its
public use jurisprudence.202 As noted previously, in the early cases, the Court
limited public uses to such things as highways, railroads, and other public works.
As the Supreme Court expanded its public use jurisprudence, so too did state
courts.
First, it is critical to note that even before Kelo, courts allowed takings for
economic development.203 Thus, the door was open to potential eminent domain
economic development abuse long before Kelo. And since many states have
enacted reform outlawing the use of eminent domain for economic development,
these pre-Kelo cases allowing eminent domain are no longer good law.
Therefore, most of the states that were using eminent domain for economic
redevelopment before Kelo are now prohibited from doing so.
Although there are more cases prior to Kelo upholding economic
development takings, two cases serve to illustrate that the door to economic
development takings was open before Kelo. In Prince George's County v.
Collington Crossroads, Inc.,204 a county in Maryland exercised eminent domain
in order to build an industrial park that was predicted to "provide employment
opportunities as well as general economic benefit for the residents of Prince
to Wyoming's Eminent Domain Act, 8 WYO. L. REV. I, 22-23 (2008) (stating that Wyoming's statutory
amendments were designed to prevent a Kelo-typc case in Wyoming and providing an in-depth overview of
Wyoming's eminent domain jurisprudence).
200. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-26-501 to 801.
201. llya Somin, The Judicial Reaction to Kelo, 4 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2011) (noting the lack of
scholarly analysis of the judicial reaction to Kelo compared to the legislative analysis). Professor Somin also
notes that most judges have not reacted favorably to Kelo. Id. at 5.
202. See Shaun Hoting, The Kelo Revolution, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 65, 67 (2009) ("Instead of
being a dramatic extension of the takings power of the government, Kelo is an incremental step on a road the
Court has been on for more than half a century.").
203. Prince George's Cnty. v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 339 A.2d 278 (Md. 1975); City of Shreveport
v. Chanse Gas Corp., 794 So. 2d 962 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
204. 339 A.2d 278 (Md. 1975).
TEN YEARS AFTER KELO
George's County."205  The court held that "projects reasonably designed to
benefit the general public, by significantly enhancing the economic growth of the
State or its subdivisions, are public uses . . -.206
Likewise, in City of Shreveport v. Chanse Gas Corp.,207 a Louisiana Court
of Appeals held that an economic development taking was a valid public use.208
The City of Shreveport planned to use eminent domain so that it could build a
new hotel and convention center.209 The defendants argued that economic
development was not a valid public purpose.2l0 The Louisiana Court of Appeal
disagreed, and relying on two other pre-Kelo cases allowing economic
development takings as valid public uses,2 11 held that "economic development,
in the form of a convention center and headquarters hotel, satisfies the public
purposes and public necessity requirements..." of the Louisiana
Constitution.
2 12
Both City of Shreveport and Prince George's County serve to illustrate that
Kelo was not the first to hold that economic development constitutes a valid
public use. Rather, courts have been exercising eminent domain for economic
development for a long time. In fact, as City of Shreveport indicates, Louisiana
had held that economic development was a valid public use before Kelo. But
after Kelo, Louisiana, along with many other states, enacted reform outlawing
economic development takings. Thus, it follows that the effect of the Kelo
decision has been positive-without the Kelo opinion, Louisiana and many other
states would still be exercising eminent domain for economic development and
enhancement of tax revenues.
2. Post-Kelo Decisions Rejecting Economic Development as a Valid Public Use
The legislature has not been the only body of the government to reject
Kelo's expansive interpretation of what qualifies as a public use. In much the
same way that state legislatures have prohibited takings for economic
development, some courts have decided that economic development does not fit
the judicial mold of a public use.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Board of County Commissioners v.
205. Id. at 280-81, 288.
206. Id. at 289.
207. 794 So. 2d 962 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
208. Id. at 971-75.
209. Id. at 966-68.
210. Id. at 969.
211. Town of Vidalia v. Unopened Succcssion of Ruffin, 663 So. 2d 315 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Board of
Comm'rs v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 625 So. 2d 1070 (1993). In Town of Vidalia, property was sought to be
acquired by eminent domain "for recreation and tourism purposes... and to promote economic growth through
tourism." Town of Vidalia, 663 So. 2d at 316. The Louisiana Court of Appeal held that economic development
in an area with a poor economy and high unemployment rate met the public purpose requirement. Id. at 319.
In Board of Commissioners, a governing board sought to exercise eminent domain in order to expand the
existing convention center. Board of Conm'rs, 625 So. 2d at 1072-73. The Court of Appeal held that the
condemnor "established that in order to fulfill its public purpose of promoting economic growth and
development of the area, it is necessary to further expand the convention center." Id. at 1074.
212. City of Shreveport, 794 So. 2d at 973.
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Lowery "h[e]ld that takings for the purpose of economic development alone (not
in connection with the removal of blighted property) do not constitute a public
use or public purpose to support the exercise of eminent domain .... -213 An
Oklahoma county sought to exercise eminent domain on unblighted properties to
build water pipelines.2 14 The county argued that the public purpose would be
served by "increased taxes, jobs and public and private investment in the
community... .- 215
In rejecting the county's argument, the court reasoned that unlike the
Connecticut statute in Kelo, which provided that economic development takings
served a public purpose, Oklahoma's statute was silent on the issue.216 The
court concluded that the Oklahoma Constitution was narrower than the broad
power under the federal constitution.217 In the end, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that "economic development alone does not constitute a public
purpose and therefore, does not constitutionally justify the County's exercise of
eminent domain. '218
In City of Norwood v. Homey,2 19 the Ohio Supreme Court expressly
rejected Kelo economic development takings.220 The City of Norwood had
plans to use eminent domain with the public purpose of blight remediation in a
neighborhood.221  But while the city code allowed eminent domain for
redevelopment of blighted areas, testimony at trial revealed that the
neighborhood did not qualify as a slum or a blighted area.222
After a long discussion about the proper level of deference owed by courts,
the Ohio Supreme Court held that "an economic or financial benefit alone is
insufficient to satisfy the public-use requirement. .". ,,223 Further, the court
noted that "any taking based solely on financial gain is void as a matter of law,
and the courts owe no deference to a legislative finding that the proposed taking
will provide financial benefit to a community. '224
While some may have been concerned about the way that the judicial
system would react to a decision like Kelo, Lowery and Horney should provide
some solace. Both courts rejected economic development as a valid public use,
and did so without the guidance of their legislatures.
Judicial reaction (when viewed with the legislative reaction) provides
strong support for the argument that the Kelo opinion has caused more good than
bad. While scholars and the public were concerned that Kelo opened the door
213. 136 P.3d 639, 653 (Okla. 2006).
214. Id. at 642-44.
215. Id. at 647-48.
216. Id. at 650.
217. Id. at 651.
218. Id. at 650.
219. 853 N.E.2d 111S (Ohio 2006).
220. Id. at 1130-1142.
221. Id. at 1123.
222. Id. at 1126.
223. Id. at 1142.
224. Id.
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for abuse all over the United States, the door has been slowly closing over the
past ten years. Some may still argue that these statutes provide a way for
condemnors to effectuate economic development takings under the guise of
blight, but, as with all else, we must trust that the judiciary will give effect to the
underlying intent of the post-Kelo reform statutes that have been enacted.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Kelo opinion has not been abused for purposes of effectuating
economic development. First, over forty states enacted legislation specifically
limiting economic development takings. While the effectiveness of the
legislation could be debated at length, the fact is that states have reacted by
taking steps in the right direction. Second, the argument that Kelo would open
the door for economic development takings is not a sound argument because
courts took an expansive interpretation of what constitutes a public use long
before Kelo. And finally, the fact that these states allowed economic
development takings before Kelo, and then enacted legislation banning economic
development takings, illustrates that Kelo caused a positive backlash: states who
were using economic development to take property will no longer be able to do
so. While some saw Kelo as a departure from previous Supreme Court
precedent and expected it to cause a wave of abuse, Kelo did just the opposite-
states and courts reacted by banning economic development takings and
tightening up other aspects of their eminent domain laws.

